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Keatan Williams 
 
 In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld FERC Order No. 745, which regulates the prices 
that wholesale market operators pay for demand response bids. At issue 
in the case was whether this regulation exceeded FERC’s wholesale 
regulation authority under the Federal Power Act, thereby impinging on 
retail markets under state regulation, and whether the pricing regulations 
within the rule were chosen in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The 
Court held Order No. 745 withstood both challenges. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 At issue in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric 
Power Supply Association was the Electric Power Supply Association’s 
(“EPSA”) challenge to whether the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) had the authority under the Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”) to promulgate Rule No. 745 (“Rule”), which regulates the prices 
that wholesale market operators pay for demand response bids. 1  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
vacated the Rule, holding that it “engage[d] in ‘direct regulation of the 
retail market’” and, that “alternatively, . . . the Rule [was] arbitrary and 
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.”2  
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and upheld the 
authority of the Rule using a three-step analysis.3 First, the Court held 
that the practices regulated by the Rule “directly affect wholesale rates,” 
and so are within FERC authority under the FPA.4 Second, the Court 
held that the Rule did not regulate retail sales and therefore complied 
with the FPA. 5  Third, the Court held that vacating the Rule would 
conflict with the core purposes of the FPA.6 Additionally, the Court held 
that the Rule was not arbitrary and capricious in the manner that it 
                                                     
1.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
2. Id. at 772 (quoting Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 216, 223-25 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
3. Id. at 773. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id.  
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regulated the sales, because FERC “addressed the issue seriously and 
carefully.”7 The Court rendered a 6-2 verdict, with Justice Samuel A. 
Alito abstaining.8 Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence 
Thomas, dissented, suggesting that the Rule should have failed all three 
steps of the test and, additionally, was arbitrary and capricious.9 While 
Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the law provides insightful dicta, for 
now FERC is within its authority to regulate demand response 
transactions in the energy market. 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 The FPA authorizes and places limits on FERC’s regulation of 
the energy market.10 Under the act, FERC may regulate “‘the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,’ including both 
wholesale electricity rates and any rule or practice ‘affecting’ such 
rates.” 11  The language giving FERC authority to promulgate rules 
affecting such rates has been interpreted in case law to limit FERC’s 
authority to rules that “directly affect the whole sale rate.”12 Additionally, 
FERC’s authority is limited by the prohibition that its rules may not 
regulate retail electricity sales. 13  This provision does not, however, 
prohibit FERC rules “just because [they] affect[]—even substantially—
the quantity or terms of retail sales.”14  
 The questions in this case apply these grants of authority 
specifically to the practice of demand response competition. In the 
current market, it is often beneficial to wholesale energy providers, 
called wholesale market operators (“WMO”), to pay “load-serving 
entities” (“LSE”) and other purchasers to use less power during peak 
hours.15 On the supply side, WMOs take bids from energy providers and 
then accept those bids starting at the lowest cost until the energy demand 
is met.16 The highest bid amount accepted is then paid to all bidders.17 
                                                     
7. Id. at 784. 
8. Id. at 765 
9. Id. at 784-89. 
10. Id. at 766; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823d (2012). 
11. FERC, 136 S Ct. at 766 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a) 
(2012)). 
12. Id. (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 
403 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
13. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. §824(b). 
14. FERC, 136 S Ct. at 776.  
15. Id. at 769-770. 
16. Id. at 770. 
17. Id. 
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Alternatively, the WMOs can pay wholesale purchasers to use less 
energy during peak hours, which allows the WMOs to accept lower bids 
and save money overall. 18  Additionally, this scheme promotes lower 
energy use and helps to prevent overloading the electrical grid.19 These 
payments to buyers for not using electricity are called demand 
response.20 WMOs, recognizing the potential for a more effective system, 
started implementing demand response bids into their auctions around 
2000 with permission from FERC.21   
 In 2005, Congress encouraged demand response in the Energy 
Policy Act. 22  Then, in 2008, FERC issued Order No. 719, which 
“require[d] wholesale market operators to receive demand response 
bids . . . except when the state regulatory authority . . . bar[red] such 
demand response participation.” 23  This order allowed WMOs to 
compensate demand response providers however they chose.24 Lastly, in 
2011, FERC issued Order No. 745, Demand Response Competition in 
Organized Wholesale Energy Markets.25  This is the rule under review in 
this case.  
Rule 745 “requires that demand response providers . . . receive 
as much for conserving energy as generators do for producing it.”26 This 
requirement specified two conditions which would not apply. First, the 
bidder must have “the capability to provide the service,” and secondly, 
paying for the bid “must be cost-effective.”27 Additional language in the 
Rule preserved states’ right to ban the practice under Order No. 719.28 In 
promulgating the Rule, FERC rejected an alternative formula that would 
have allowed WMOs to pay the equal price minus retail price to demand 
response bidders.29  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 2642 (2012). 
23. FERC, 136 S. Ct. at 771; see 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1) (2015). 
24. FERC, 136 S Ct. at 771. 
25.  Id.; see 18 C.R.F. § 35.28(g)(1)(v). 
26. FERC, 136 S Ct. at 771. 
27. Id.; see 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, ¶¶ 48-49 (Mar. 24, 2011). 
28. FERC, 136 S. Ct. at 772. 
29. Id. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The Rule Has an Affect on Wholesale Markets 
 
 The Court used a three-step analysis to interpret the Federal 
Power Act. The first step in the Court’s analysis was to determine 
whether the Rule regulates the wholesale market or affects the rates of 
those markets. 30  Affecting the rates means that the Rule “directly 
affect[s] the wholesale rate.”31 Because the Rule focused on regulating a 
program with the primary goal of reducing wholesale rates, the Court 
held that it “directly affect[ed] wholesale prices” and it was “hard to 
think of a practice that does so more.”32  
 
B.  The Rule Does Not Regulate Retail Sales 
 
 To fall within FERC’s authority under the FPA, the Rule must 
also “not regulate retail electricity sales.” 33  This test on the limit of 
FERC’s authority acknowledges that “transactions that occur on the 
wholesale market have natural consequences at the retail level.”34 The 
Court thus framed the jurisdictional argument in terms of markets, 
instead of sales, determining that the Rule focused “exclusively on the 
wholesale market and govern[ed] exclusively that market’s rules.”35 To 
come to this conclusion, the Court looked to FERC’s justification for the 
regulation and found it to be based entirely on improving the wholesale 
market.36 
 The Court directly addressed EPSA’s arguments on the 
regulation of retail versus wholesale jurisdiction. EPSA first argued that 
because large energy consumers purchase energy on the wholesale 
market, the Rule effectively raises retail rates because the “opportunity to 
make demand response bids in the wholesale market changes consumer’s 
calculations.”37 For example, EPSA argued that if a factory could buy 
electricity for ten dollars or be paid five dollars to not use electricity, by 
sacrificing the opportunity to get paid for reducing use, the retail price 
                                                     
30. Id. at 773. 
31. Id. at 774. 
32. Id. at 775. The dissent did not consider this test appropriate for 
analysis under the FPA. Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
33. Id. at 775 (majority opinion). 
34. Id. at 776. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id.  
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“effectively” rises from ten dollars to fifteen dollars. 38  Without any 
specific citation, the Court held that their previous decisions “uniformly 
speak about rates, for electricity and all else, in only their most prosaic, 
garden-variety sense.”39 Therefore, the Court rejected the argument of 
the “effective” rate and held that “EPSA’s theoretical construction thus 
runs head long into the real world.”40 
 ESPA next argued that FERC promulgated the Rule to 
deliberately lure retail customers on to the wholesale market so that 
fewer purchasers were under state authority.41 The Court turned to its 
previous history of the rule to refute this claim.42 The Court reiterated 
that FERC only played a role in this type of market at the request of the 
WMOs and even when doing so, granted veto power to the states.43 The 
Court rejected this argument without much discussion. 
 The dissent accepted and bolstered EPSA’s argument of 
“effective” price by including a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, 
and using an analogy of airplane vouchers. 44  The majority gave this 
argument no credit, considering it “convoluted.” 45  Additionally, the 
dissent focused on purchasers instead of markets when analyzing 
whether the Rule regulates retail sales.46 With this focus, the dissent held 
that the Rule exceeds its authority because some of the companies 
entering demand response bids are large consumers of electricity and not 
re-sellers and therefore the rule is regulating retail sales.47 The majority 
did not discuss this theory. 
 
C.  Invalidating the Rule Would Subvert the FPA 
 
 The Court further held that invalidating the Rule using EPSA’s 
arguments would subvert the FPA.48 The Court reasoned that if FERC 
was unable to regulate demand response at all, as the EPSA argued, then 
the whole system of demand response bidding would cease to exist 
because FERC could not have approved its implementation in the first 
                                                     
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 778. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 778-779. 
42. Id. at 779. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at 778 n.9 (majority opinion). 
46. Id. at 785-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
47. Id. at 786. 
48. Id. at 780 (majority opinion). 
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place.49 If this were to occur, the Court reasoned, it would “flout the 
FPA’s core objects” and “halt a process that so evidently enables [the 
FPA objectives] of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in the 
wholesale energy market.” 50  The dissent devoted the majority of its 
opinion to addressing this reasoning, which it considered “alarmist 
hyperbole.”51 The dissent believeed that, at most, invalidating the Rule 
would “eliminate this particular flavor of FERC-regulated demand 
response.”52 
 
D.  The Rule Passes the APA Standard 
 
 Lastly, EPSA challenged FERC’s decision of how to formulate 
required prices under the Rule as “arbitrary and capricious” and therefore 
in violation of the APA.53 EPSA argued that FERC arbitrarily chose to 
require WMOs to compensate bidders at the price they would have paid 
an energy provider bid instead of subtracting the retail price.54 The Court 
relied heavily on agency deference and held that “[FERC] addressed 
[the] issue seriously and carefully.”55 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The Court upheld Rule No. 745 with vigor, and in doing so, 
promoted the use of demand response bidders to enable a more efficient 
and reliable electricity market. The Court further established that in 
complicated issues of state and federal energy regulation, it will continue 
to differentiate by traditional definitions of markets and not get bogged 
down in the complexities of the energy market. 
                                                     
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 781-82. 
51. Id. at 788 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 782 (majority opinion). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 784. 
